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COMMENTS
I’M A CONDUIT, YOU’RE GLUE, FUNDS FLOW
THROUGH ME AND STICK TO YOU:
THE MERE CONDUIT DEFENSE IN
BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCE
CLAIMS AND ITS APPLICATION
TO FREIGHT FACTORING COMPANIES
By: Jennifer S. McDaniel*
ABSTRACT
Freight factoring companies provide much-needed cash flow and additional
services to trucking companies. The trucking company sells its accounts re-
ceivable, or invoices, at a discount to the freight factoring company and re-
ceives an advance of funds in exchange. The freight factoring company will
then begin collecting on these invoices from the trucking company’s custom-
ers, or debtors. When a debtor sends funds to a freight factoring company, it is
paying for the services rendered by the trucking company. As such, the freight
factoring company is obligated to apply the funds it receives to its client’s in-
voices in accordance with remittance attached to the debtor’s payment.
When a debtor files bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee seeks to recover as
much property as possible for the bankruptcy estate. Thus, it is not uncom-
mon for freight factoring companies to find that funds it received from a
debtor may be subject to a preferential claim under Bankruptcy Code section
547 for recovery by the bankruptcy estate. However, there is a judicially cre-
ated exception from recovery called the mere conduit defense. This Comment
explores the origins of that defense, its application in cases involving banks as
financial intermediaries and as payees on loans, and advocates that freight
factoring companies should be viewed as mere conduits in bankruptcy prefer-
ence claims.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Late Friday evening, after being gone for the past week hauling
freight, Joe Smith made it home just in time to join his wife, Jane, at
the kitchen table to sort through piles of bills and figure out how to
make it through another week. Joe thought running his own trucking
business would be a bit more glamorous than it has turned out to be.
Even though Joe is able to find work and, actually, just delivered a
load of freight, he will not see payment from that delivery for another
month or so. Unfortunately, that is just standard payment terms for
the trucking industry.
But on this evening, Jane hears an advertisement on the radio for a
freight factoring company—a third party that purchases freight bills
and advances money on those bills to help struggling trucking compa-
nies.1 From the first phone call with the freight factoring company,
things start looking up for the Smiths. By purchasing Joe’s freight bills,
the freight factoring company helps with cash flow, as well as auditing,
available credit, and even collections services.2 There is also an online
1. DAVID B. TATGE ET AL., AMERICAN FACTORING LAW 423 (2009).
2. Id.
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account for instant access to all the additional services the freight fac-
toring company offers.3
After some time, the freight factoring company receives an unset-
tling call. One of Joe’s customers filed bankruptcy. Payments made to
the freight factoring company over the last three months are now sub-
ject to a preference claim.4 The debtor already benefitted from this
earlier transaction—having received the service it desired. But now,
the freight factoring company is being held liable based on the fact
that it advanced funds on the freight bills, collected on them, and ap-
plied the payments as instructed by the debtor.5
The trustee for the debtor’s bankruptcy estate pursues a recovery
action against the freight factoring company merely because that is
where the bankrupt debtor remitted payment.6 The trustee, without
regard for whom or what the bankrupt debtor was paying for, is seek-
ing to restore as much property to the estate as quickly as possible.7
Thus, for simply providing much-needed assistance to a struggling
trucking company, the freight factoring company finds itself in the
most inequitable of situations. Now, through no fault or carelessness
of its own, the freight factoring company must return payments, deliv-
ered previously in anticipation of the payments to the trucking com-
pany who provided service, to the bankruptcy estate.8
II. FREIGHT FACTORING
A. What is Freight Factoring?
“Factoring is a type of financing where one business . . . sells its
right to receive payment for goods sold or services rendered . . . to
another business at a discounted price.”9 Factoring is common among
many industries.10 In the transportation industry, trucking companies
3. See id. at 121.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012).
5. See TATGE ET AL., supra note 1; see also Small-Business Financing: Why Are
Companies Choosing to Factor and How Does It Work?, FSW FUNDING 4, http://
inbusinessmag.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FSW_WhitePaper.pdf [http://perma
.cc/EUY4-5ZRW] [hereinafter Small-Business Financing].
6. See § 547; see also Small-Business Financing, supra note 5.
7. See M. Gordon Hearn et al., The Carrier Must Get Paid—Fact or Fiction, 13
TTL 14, 17 (2012), http://www.scopelitis.com/scopelitis/assets/dynapsis/Carrier%20
Must%20Get%20PaidFact%20or%20Fiction%20Tauscher.pdf [http://perma.cc/6K58-
WDDM].
8. § 547; Michael R. Adele, Avoidable Transfers: Recent Ninth Circuit Develop-
ments in Determining Transferee Status, the Conduit Defense and Related Burdens of
Proof, 29 CAL. BANKR. J. 347, 348 (2007).
9. New Century Fin., Inc. v. Olympic Credit Fund, Inc., 487 F. App’x 912, 913
(5th Cir. 2012); see also Express Working Capital, LLC v. Starving Students, Inc., 28
F. Supp. 3d 660, 668 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
10. Frequently Asked Questions About Factoring, FACTORING EXPLORER, http://
www.factoringcompanies.org/articles/frequently-asked-questions-about-factoring
[http://perma.cc/XYH2-4UK2].
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rely on factoring to finance their freight bills.11 The companies that
finance these freight bills, along with providing additional services, are
called freight factoring companies.12
Freight factoring companies will purchase a trucking company’s
freight bills and advance the trucking company money on those bills.13
By quickly converting its freight bills to cash, a trucking company “can
better meet its debt obligations, including payroll, fuel, equipment,
taxes, and other operating expenses.”14 Besides accelerated cash flow,
freight factoring companies also provide trucking companies with ad-
ditional services and tools to help them succeed.15 These services and
tools include, but are not limited to: freight bill auditing to ensure
accuracy, credit information on potential customers, delivery and col-
lection of factored invoices, cash application services once customer
payment is received, online reporting for detailed recordkeeping, and
savings on fuel expenditures.16
B. Freight Factoring Companies and Account Debtors
When a trucking company decides to sell its freight bills to a partic-
ular freight factoring company, the freight factoring company and the
trucking company enter into a factoring agreement whereby the truck-
ing company becomes a client of the freight factoring company and
the freight factoring company obtains a security interest in the truck-
ing company’s accounts receivable (i.e., freight bills).17 Under the
Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), “a ‘security interest’ includes
the interest of an outright buyer of ‘accounts’ . . . .”18 Revised Article
9 of the UCC broadly defines an “account” to include “a right to pay-
ment for property sold.”19
In order for a freight factoring company to preserve its collection
rights against an account, it sends notification letters to its client’s cus-
tomers (“debtors”).20 The notification letters inform debtors of the
freight factoring company’s security interest and assignment of the cli-
ent’s accounts receivable and state that payment for freight bills
should be remitted to the freight factoring company.21 Once payment
11. See TATGE ET AL., supra note 1.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. What is Factoring?, MATCH FACTORS, https://www.matchfactors.com/faq
[http://perma.cc/XE93-XSKA].
15. See Small-Business Financing, supra note 5, at 6.
16. See id. at 3–6.
17. Id. at 2–3.
18. Barkley Clark, Factoring: Key Issues Under the UCC, COM. FACTOR (Int’l Fac-
toring Ass’n, San Luis Obispo, Cal.) Spring 2004, at 1, 1 (quoting U.C.C. § 1-201(37)
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001)).
19. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2010)).
20. Small-Business Financing, supra note 5, at 3–4.
21. Id.
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is received, the freight factoring company applies the payment to its
client’s invoices as directed by the debtor through remittance
information.22
The factoring relationship between a freight factoring company and
a trucking company is a “recourse” relationship, meaning that if an
invoice purchased by the freight factoring company is not paid by the
debtor, due to a dispute or insolvency of the debtor, the freight factor-
ing company may charge back the invoice to the trucking company to
recover funds advanced on that particular invoice.23 This disciplined
approach to identifying paid and unpaid invoices in a recourse factor-
ing relationship has extreme significance as will be seen in Section
VI.A.
C. When Account Debtors File Bankruptcy
When a trucking company has provided a service, and the freight
factoring company receives payment from the debtor, one would be
inclined to think the transaction is completed. Indeed, most anyone
would assume this is the case. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for
payments received by a freight factoring company to be claimed as
preferential when a debtor files for bankruptcy.24 Thus, despite having
purchased and advanced funds on a freight bill in good faith, a freight
factoring company may have any payments it received within a ninety-
day period prior to a debtor’s bankruptcy subject to disgorgement and
returned to the bankruptcy estate.25 It is typical for the representative
of a bankruptcy estate, charged with recovering as much transferred
property as possible within a limited period of time, to involve freight
factoring companies in preference claims.26
III. BACKGROUND ON BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCE CLAIMS
Cases involving pre-petition avoidable transfers and preferential
claims are governed by the federal Bankruptcy Code.27 “Bankruptcy
law inserts possible avoidability into a number of transaction types
with debtors,” especially those headed towards bankruptcy.28 Among
these are avoidable pre-petition transfer actions created by Bank-
ruptcy Code section 547.29 Section 547 defines pre-petition transfers as
those made out of the debtor’s estate before the filing of the bank-
22. Id. at 4.
23. TATGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 129, 183.
24. Hearn et al., supra note 7.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012) (defining pre-petition avoidable transfers subject to
preference claim).
28. Douglass E. Barron, Stern v. Marshall and the Bankruptcy Code’s Transfer
Avoidance Actions, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 563, 566 (2013).
29. Id. at 565–66.
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ruptcy petition and classifies these transfers as “preferences” which
allows the trustee to avoid them.30
A. What Is a Preference Claim?
The representative of a bankruptcy estate, generally a trustee, has
broad powers under the federal Bankruptcy Code to ‘avoid’ or set
aside certain transfers of property made by the debtor . . . shortly
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, so that this property
may be returned to the estate for the benefit of all persons who
have valid claims against the debtor.31
One of the ways a trustee may avoid a transfer of property is by estab-
lishing a preference claim.32 Under Bankruptcy Code section 547, a
trustee may claim that transfers made by the debtor to another person
or entity were preferential and, therefore, qualify for avoidance.33 As
a result, a trustee is permitted to recover payments from unsecured
creditors within 90 days of the filing of its petition.34 The purpose of
this provision is to preclude an insolvent debtor from favoring particu-
lar creditors and causing other creditors to become nervous and pull
their business away when bankruptcy seems inevitable.35
B. Recovery of Avoided Preference Claim under
Bankruptcy Code Section 550(a)(1)
Where the grounds for avoidance are established under Bankruptcy
Code section 547, the means of actually recovering the property in
question is provided by Bankruptcy Code section 550(a)(1).36 Section
550(a)(1) states:
to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section . . . 547 . . . the
trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property trans-
ferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from –
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose ben-
efit such transfer was made.37
30. ZVI Guttman v. Constr. Program Grp. (In re Railworks Corp.), 760 F.3d 398,
402 (4th Cir. 2014).
31. John E. Theuman, Annotation, What Constitutes “Initial Transferee” Under
§550(a) of Bankruptcy Code, Which Permits Recovery of Property, or Value Thereof,
from Initial Transferee of Property to Extent Transfer is Avoided, 92 A.L.R. FED. 631,
634 (1989 & Supp. 2015).




35. Luper v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. (In re Carled, Inc.), 91 F.3d 811, 815 (6th
Cir. 1996).
36. Theuman, supra note 31, at 634–35.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2012).
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The purpose of section 550 is “to restore the estate to the financial
condition it would have enjoyed if the transfer had not occurred.”38
Under section 550(a)(1), an initial transferee is strictly liable.39 There-
fore, a trustee may always recover from the initial transferee regard-
less of the transferee’s “good faith, value, or lack of knowledge of the
voidability of the transfer.”40 Due to the potentially harsh conse-
quences a party faces as an initial transferee, the bankruptcy courts’
interpretation of section 550(a)(1) has become extremely important in
situations faced by freight factoring companies.41
IV. COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF INITIAL TRANSFEREE
UNDER SECTION 550(A)(1)
If a trustee is going to hold a party liable as an initial transferee, it
must first be determined who would qualify as an initial transferee.
“The Bankruptcy Code does not [provide a definition] and the legisla-
tive history is silent on the issue as well.”42 While bankruptcy trustees
favor a literal reading of the statutory language,43 the courts have de-
veloped their own standards.44
A. Literal Application of Section 550(a)(1)
In In re Fabric Buys of Jericho, the trustee sought a literal interpre-
tation of section 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code by claiming that
“the initial recipient of an allegedly preferential transfer is liable as
the ‘initial transferee.’”45 A bankruptcy court rejected this interpreta-
tion because of the potential inequity that would result.46 “A literal
application of section 550(a)(1) would permit the Trustee to recover
from a party who is innocent of wrongdoing and deserves
protection.”47
38. Bruno Mach., Corp. v. Troy Die Cutting Co., LLC (In re Bruno Mach. Corp.),
435 B.R. 819, 848 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Hirsch v. Gersten (In re Centen-
nial Textiles, Inc.), 220 B.R. 165, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
39. Askenaizer v. Wyatt (In re BeaconVision Inc.), 340 B.R. 674, 678 (Bankr.
N.D.N.H. 2006).
40. Id.
41. See In re BeaconVision Inc., 340 B.R. 674.
42. CNB Int’l, Inc. v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC (In re CNB Int’l, Inc.), 440 B.R. 31,
38 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2010).
43. Gropper v. Unitrac, S.A. (In re Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc.), 33 B.R. 334, 335
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
44. See id. at 337.
45. Id. at 335.
46. Id. at 337 (“In some circumstances, a literal application of section 550(a)
would permit the Trustee to recover from a party who is innocent of wrongdoing and
deserves protection. In such circumstances the bankruptcy court should exercise its
discretion to use its equitable powers . . . to prevent an inequitable result.”).
47. Id. (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 550.02, at 550-7–550-8 (Alan N.
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev.)).
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In In re International Administrative Services, Inc., the Eleventh Cir-
cuit adopted the same position that a literal interpretation of section
550(a)(1) would yield “harsh and inflexible” results.48 Construed liter-
ally, the statute would suggest that an initial transferee is “the first
party which received possession of the property in question after it left
the hands of the debtor.”49 But, the court was “disinclined to construe
[section 550(a)(1)] in such a rigid manner” because of the numerous
occasions where the initial recipient of funds “may have nothing to do
with the debtor’s property other than facilitating its transfer.”50
Over twenty-five years later, a United States District Court in In re
CNB International echoed the same opposition to a literal statutory
interpretation of section 550(a)(1).51 According to the court, such an
interpretation—that the first entity in physical possession of funds or
“anyone who touches the money” is an initial transferee—would lead
to absurd and unintended results.52
B. Standard for Initial Transferee Classification
Refusing to construe section 550(a)(1) in a strictly literal manner,
courts developed their own equitable standard for determining
whether a party constitutes an initial transferee. This standard estab-
lishes two factors used to examine a potential initial transferee classifi-
cation. These factors are: (1) the transferee’s exercise of dominion or
control over the property, and (2) a direct business relationship be-
tween the debtor and transferee.53
1. The Dominion and Control Test
The Seventh Circuit established the dominion and control test in
Bonded Financial Services, Inc. v. European American Bank.54 Nu-
merous circuits have since adopted the Seventh Circuit’s dominion
and control test to determine whether a party is an initial transferee.55
48. IBT Int’l, Inc. v. Northern (In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc.), 408 F.3d 689, 704
(11th Cir. 2005) (“The strict interpretation of § 550(a) produces a harsh and inflexible
result that runs counterintuitive to the nature of avoidance actions.”).
49. Id. at 705.
50. Id.
51. See CNB Int’l, Inc. v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC (In re CNB Int’l, Inc.), 440 B.R.
31, 38 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2010).
52. Id. (quoting Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 893
(7th Cir. 1988)); see also Christy v. Alexander & Alexander of N.Y., Inc. (In re Fin-
ley), 130 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that “the initial transfer is something
other than the passing of mere possession. Indeed, if couriers and other mere conduits
were deemed ‘initial transferees,’ some surely unintended consequences would
ensue.”).
53. Bonded, 838 F.2d at 893; Gropper v. Unitrac, S.A. (In re Fabric Buys of
Jericho, Inc.), 33 B.R. 334, 337 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
54. Bonded, 838 F.2d at 893.
55. In re CNB Int’l, Inc., 440 B.R. at 38 (“Bonded is the seminal case on the issue
of initial transferees, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
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Dominion or control over money or some other asset is defined as
“the right to put the money to one’s own purposes.”56 Mere physical
possession of property will not suffice.57
Even though the Bankruptcy Code does not specifically define ini-
tial transferee, courts have “consistently held that the [Seventh Cir-
cuit] dominion and control test is the appropriate test to apply when
determining whether a person or entity constitutes an initial trans-
feree under § 550[(a)(1)].”58 Thus, the more dominion or control a
party is deemed to possess, the more probable it is that the party will
be considered an initial transferee.59 The Seventh Circuit’s decision is
discussed more fully in Section V.A.
2. The Direct Business Relationship Test
Although the bankruptcy court developed the direct business rela-
tionship test in In re Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc.,60 the Fourth Circuit
has continued to expand and advance this standard.61 If a party has
direct business dealings with a debtor, then that party is considered to
be an initial transferee within the meaning of section 550(a)(1).62
Where multiple parties are involved, the courts use this direct business
relationship test to determine which party, in fact, has the relationship
and is, therefore, an initial transferee, and which party, or parties, is
merely an intermediary between the debtor and initial transferee.63
“[A] party cannot be an initial transferee if he is a mere [intermedi-
ary] for the party who had a direct business relationship with the
debtor.”64
C. The Mere Conduit Defense
One potential defense to classification as an initial transferee, and
thus liability under section 550(a)(1), is to show that the party in-
have also adopted some version of the Bonded standard referred to as the ‘dominion’
and/or ‘control’ test.”).
56. Bonded, 838 F.2d at 893.
57. ZVI Guttman v. Assocs. Commercial Corp. (In re Furley’s Transp., Inc.), 272
B.R. 161, 177 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001) (citing Bowers v. Atlanta Motor Speedway, Inc.
(In re Se. Hotel Props. Ltd. P’ship), 99 F.3d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 1996)).
58. 718 Arch St. Assocs. v. Blatstein (In re Blatstein), 260 B.R. 698, 714 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting In re Se. Hotel Props. Ltd. P’ship, 99 F.3d at 154).
59. See Bonded, 838 F.2d at 893.
60. Gropper v. Unitrac, S.A. (In re Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc.), 33 B.R. 334, 337
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). In granting summary judgment for the firm, the court ob-
served that an initial transferee is one who deals directly with the debtor. Id.
61. For example, the Fourth Circuit has held that the party with the direct business
relationship is an initial transferee. See ZVI Guttman v. Constr. Program Grp. (In re
Railworks Corp.), 760 F.3d 398, 404–05 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Lowry v. Sec. Pac.
Bus. Credit, Inc. (In re Columbia Data Prods., Inc.), 892 F.2d 26, 29 (4th Cir. 1989).
62. In re Columbia Data Prods., Inc., 892 F.2d at 28.
63. Id.; see also In re Railworks Corp., 760 F.3d at 404.
64. In re Railworks Corp., 760 F.3d at 404 (quoting In re Columbia Data Prods.,
Inc., 892 F.2d at 28).
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volved was no more than a mere conduit.65 A conduit is “a party with
actual or constructive possession of the asset before transferring it to
another person.”66 Thus, a “mere conduit” is not an initial transferee
under section 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code because it has no do-
minion or control over the transferred property,67 and it does not have
a direct relationship with the debtor.68 By definition, “conduits can do
no more than to transmit the transferred property received to another
party.”69 For that reason, bankruptcy courts have found that a party
acting as a mere conduit of funds is not an initial transferee “within
the ambit of section 550[(a)(1)]” and, as such, “no recovery may be
had from the [party].”70
V. USE OF MERE CONDUIT DEFENSE: FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
As demonstrated supra, whether one is considered an initial trans-
feree against whom a trustee may recover is a significant question that
carries with it a profound effect on the actions of a trustee.71 This is
especially true for financial intermediaries who are involved in the
transfers of funds, such as banks and other persons who handle money
for third parties.72 When a financial intermediary finds itself the sub-
ject of an avoidance action with a bankruptcy trustee seeking to re-
cover pre-petition transfers from it, the financial intermediary often
argues that it is not an initial transferee under the bankruptcy code,
but rather a “mere conduit” that lacked dominion or control over the
funds it received.73
A. Banks as Intermediaries in Fund Transfers
In Bonded Financial Services, Inc. v. European American Bank, Eu-
ropean American Bank gave Michael Ryan a loan to run his busi-
ness.74 Bonded Financial Services sent European American a $200,000
check payable to its order with an instruction that the check was to be
65. See Kirschenbaum v. Leeds Morelli & Brown P.C. (In re The Robert Plan of
N.Y. Corp.), 456 B.R. 150, 159 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011).
66. Id.
67. Id.; see also Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 893
(7th Cir. 1988).
68. See Gropper v. Unitrac, S.A. (In re Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc.), 33 B.R. 334,
337 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
69. In re The Robert Plan of N.Y. Corp., 456 B.R. at 159 (citing Authentic Fitness
Corp. v. Dobbs Temp. Help Servs. (In re Warnaco Grp.), No. 01 B 41643(RLB), 2006
WL 278152, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006)).
70. Salomon v. Nedlloyd, Inc. (In re Black & Geddes, Inc.), 59 B.R. 873, 875
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing In re Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc., 33 B.R. 334).
71. Adele, supra note 8.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 891 (7th Cir.
1988).
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deposited into Ryan’s account.75 European American followed the in-
struction and, ten days after depositing the check into Ryan’s account,
Ryan instructed European American to debit his bank account for
$200,000 in order to reduce the outstanding balance on his loan with
the bank. European American did as Ryan instructed.76
Shortly thereafter, Bonded Financial filed a petition in bankruptcy
and its trustee sought to recover the $200,000 from European Ameri-
can under section 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.77 The trustee
contended that European American, as payee of the check it received
from Bonded Financial, was an initial transferee under section
550(a)(1).78 The Seventh Circuit did not agree with the trustee’s asser-
tion.79 Even though European American was the payee on the check,
the Seventh Circuit determined that it was acting as a financial inter-
mediary and “held the check only for the purpose of fulfilling an in-
struction to make the funds available to someone else.”80
The Seventh Circuit established in Bonded Financial Services the
minimum standard needed to be classified as an initial transferee.81
This minimum standard is known as the dominion and control test
(discussed supra, Section IV.B.1), which has been adopted by numer-
ous circuits.82 According to the Bonded Financial Services court, if one
has the right to put money it receives to “one’s own purposes,” then it
has dominion over the money and could be classified as an initial
transferee.83
The Tenth Circuit employed this dominion and control test in In re
First Security Mortgage Co.84 In that case, Gary Hobbs opened a busi-
ness checking account with Citizens Bank of Sapulpa.85 Hobbs re-
ceived various funds from First Security Mortgage Company that were
deposited into his Citizens Bank account.86 Within a year of those de-
posits being made, First Security filed bankruptcy.87 The trustee over
First Security’s bankruptcy estate sought to recover the various depos-





79. Id. at 893.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., CNB Int’l, Inc. v. Lloyds TSB Bank plc (In re CNB Int’l, Inc.), 440
B.R. 31, 38 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Bonded is the seminal case on the issue of
initial transferees.”).
83. Bonded, 838 F.2d at 893.
84. Malloy v. Citizens Bank (In re First Sec. Mortg. Co.), 33 F.3d 42, 44 (10th Cir.
1994).
85. Id. at 43.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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zens Bank was an initial transferee within the meaning of section
550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.88
Because Citizens Bank was obligated to make the funds deposited
by First Security available to Hobbs upon his request, the court found
that Citizens Bank did not have dominion or control over the funds.89
Additionally, the court noted that Citizens Bank had no direct busi-
ness relationship with First Security and so Citizens Bank held the
funds it received “only for the purpose of fulfilling an instruction to
make the funds available to someone else.”90 Therefore, Citizens
Bank acted only as a financial intermediary and was not an initial
transferee.91
Similarly, in In re Colombian Coffee, a bank was found to not be an
initial transferee because it did not exercise dominion and control
over the funds it received.92 During a four-week period, three sepa-
rate transfers were made from Colombian Coffee Company, Inc.’s
bank accounts in New York and Miami for deposit into General Cof-
fee Corporation’s bank account with First Alabama Bank of Mobile
(“Mobile Bank”).93 Without delay, General Coffee used the trans-
ferred funds to pay for debt it owed to a third party.94 Three months
after these transfers occurred, Colombian Coffee and General Coffee
filed bankruptcy.95 The trustee for Colombian Coffee’s bankruptcy es-
tate sought to recover the funds transferred to Mobile Bank alleging
that Mobile Bank was an initial transferee within the meaning of sec-
tion 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.96
The court noted that classifying Mobile Bank as an initial transferee
would not only violate Congress’s intention in passing this section of
the Bankruptcy Code,97 but would also provide Colombian Coffee’s
trustee with “a windfall from an innocent bystander.”98 The court
found no rationale for forcing an “innocent link in the commercial
chain [to] bear the loss of a . . . preferential transfer that has vanished
beyond the trustee’s reach.”99
88. Id.
89. Id. at 44 (citing Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890,
894 (7th Cir. 1988)).
90. Id. (quoting Bonded, 838 F.2d at 893).
91. Id.
92. See Metsch v. First Ala. Bank (In re Colombian Coffee Co.), 59 B.R. 643, 645
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986).
93. Id. at 644.
94. Metsch v. City Nat’l Bank (In re Colombian Coffee Co.), 64 B.R. 585, 585
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986).
95. In re Colombian Coffee Co., 59 B.R. at 644.
96. Id.
97. Id. In passing section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress hoped to prevent
frustration in recovering avoidable transfers by precluding “multiple transfers or con-
voluted business transactions.” Id. at 644–45 (quoting Gropper v. Unitrac, S.A. (In re
Fabric Buys of Jerico, Inc., 33 B.R. 334, 336–37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
98. In re Colombian Coffee Co., 59 B.R. at 645.
99. Id.
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However, the guiding principle behind the court’s decision not to
classify Mobile Bank as an initial transferee was the dominion and
control test.100 Since Mobile Bank did not have discretion to put the
transferred funds it received to its own use, it did not exercise domin-
ion and control over the funds.101 According to the court, Mobile
Bank merely
served as a . . . conduit employed by the transferor in moving its
property to another corporation. Its role in this transfer was indis-
tinguishable from that of a messenger, the postal service, a common
carrier, a warehouse . . . . It derived no benefit from the transfer,
other than its customary fee for its banking services. It was granted
no discretion with respect to the disposition of the property en-
trusted to it. It could not have refused to follow the debtor’s
instructions.102
Just as in Bonded Financial Services, where the bank had to follow the
instructions it received from its customer regarding transferred funds,
Mobile Bank was obligated to follow its customer’s, Colombian Cof-
fee’s, instructions with regards to the funds it received.103 Therefore,
the court could not classify Mobile Bank as an initial transferee once
lack of dominion and control was established.104
B. Banks as Payees on Loans
Banks do not always find themselves classified as “mere conduits,”
however. For example, federal courts have distinguished between
banks acting as financial intermediaries and banks receiving payment
as payees on loans.105 In the former, the mere conduit defense applies;
yet, in the latter, banks are classified as an initial transferee within the
meaning of section 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code and subject to
recovery of transferred funds.106
Even the Seventh Circuit in Bonded Financial Services, although
holding that the bank was a mere conduit, discussed the distinction
between banks acting as financial intermediaries versus recipients of
loan payments.107 The court held that since the bank followed the in-
structions attached to the check and deposited the funds into Ryan’s
account, it did not exercise dominion and control over the funds and




103. Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir.
1988); In re Colombian Coffee Co., 59 B.R. at 645.
104. See In re Colombian Coffee Co., 59 B.R. at 645.
105. Sec. First Nat’l Bank v. Brunson (In re Coutee), 984 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir.
1993); Theuman, supra note 31, at 641.
106. Theuman, supra note 31, at 641.
107. Bonded, 838 F.2d at 892–93.
108. Id. at 893.
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outstanding loan account with the bank.109 However, the court noted
that if instead the instruction accompanying the check said, “use this
check to reduce Ryan’s loan,” the outcome would have changed.110 By
specifically allocating the check for immediate use in paying down
Ryan’s debt to the bank, the bank, as payee on the loan, would be
considered an initial transferee under section 550(a)(1).111
In a Fifth Circuit case, In re Coutee, Security First National Bank
loaned nearly $25,000 to Thelton and Emogene Coutee to assist with
legal costs regarding a personal injury case.112 Once judgment was
awarded to the Coutees, they endorsed the check to their law firm,
who deposited it into a trust account.113 From those funds, the firm
claimed applicable legal fees, paid the loan from Security First in full,
and then returned the remaining portion to the Coutees.114 Within
ninety days of full payment of the loan, the Coutees filed Chapter 7
bankruptcy.115 Soon thereafter, the bankruptcy trustee brought an ac-
tion against Security First to recover the loan payment funds claiming
that the funds were preferential.116
The court adopted the dominion and control test from Bonded Fi-
nancial Services and found that Security First was an initial transferee
of the loan payment funds.117 An initial transferee need not receive
funds directly from the bankrupt debtor as long as it is the party that
“gains actual dominion or control over the funds.”118 Even though Se-
curity First received the loan payment funds from the law firm on be-
half of the Coutees, rather than directly from the Coutees, it still
gained dominion and control over those funds once received.119 As
the payee on the loan, Security First had unrestricted legal control
over the money it received and was free to do anything it wanted with
the funds.120 Even investing in something like “lottery tickets or ura-
nium stocks,” an example proffered by the Bonded Financial Services
court.121 This freedom to invest illustrated that Security First had do-
minion and control over those funds, thus making it an initial
transferee.122
109. See id.
110. Id. at 892.
111. Id.; Nordberg v. Arab Banking Corp. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 904 F.2d
588, 599 (11th Cir. 1990).
112. Sec. First Nat’l Bank v. Brunson (In re Coutee), 984 F.2d 138, 139–40 (5th Cir.
1993).




117. Id. at 141.
118. Id.; see also Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890,
893–94 (7th Cir. 1988).
119. See In re Coutee, 984 F.2d at 141.
120. See id.
121. See id. (quoting Bonded, 838 F.2d at 894).
122. See id.
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Security First opposed its classification as an initial transferee and
urged the court to find that it was a mere conduit since the law firm
was the party that initially received the endorsed check from the
Coutees and deposited the funds.123 The court disagreed with the
bank’s argument for two reasons.
First, the bank ignored the obvious fact that it did, indeed, loan
money to the Coutees.124 Regardless of the capacity in which the law
firm assisted the Coutees in obtaining the loan, it was Security First
that actually loaned the funds.125
Second, the law firm had no right to use the funds received from the
Coutees to its own use and thus lacked the necessary dominion or
control to be an initial transferee.126 By placing the settlement funds
into a trust account, the law firm acted merely in a fiduciary capacity
for the Coutees.127 Its role was to receive the settlement payment, de-
posit those funds into a trust account, retain its legal fees as agreed
upon by the lawyers and the Coutees, and send payment to Security
First on behalf of the Coutees to satisfy their loan.128 At no point
could the law firm keep or invest the money in whatever way it
wanted, unlike Security First that did enjoy such freedom.129 There-
fore, the court found that Security First, and not the law firm, pos-
sessed dominion or control over the funds and was an initial
transferee.130
In In re Thurman Construction, Inc., the bankruptcy court also con-
sidered the dominion and control test in determining whether a bank
was a mere conduit or initial transferee of avoided transfers.131 In In
re Thurman, Sun Bank of Ocala extended a revolving line of credit to
James and Beverly Thurman, principals of Thurman Construction,
Inc.132 The purpose of the line of credit was to obtain working capital
for Thurman Construction and any draws on the line were deposited
directly into Thurman Construction’s bank accounts.133 Five years af-
ter the initial line of credit was established, James Thurman died in an
automobile accident.134 Less than a year later, Thurman Construction
filed for bankruptcy.135
123. See id. at 140.







131. Grant v. Sun Bank/N. Cent. Fla. (In re Thurman Constr., Inc.), 189 B.R. 1004,
1016 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
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The bankruptcy trustee then filed a complaint against Sun Bank to
recover pre-petition line of credit payments made by Thurman Con-
struction to Sun Bank.136 The trustee claimed that these payments
were preferential transfers and had to be returned to the bankruptcy
estate.137 In its analysis, the court focused on the dominion and con-
trol test endorsed by the Eleventh Circuit that adopted its test from
the Seventh Circuit in the Bonded case.138 The court had to determine
whether Sun Bank actually gained control over the funds or whether
Sun Bank simply acted as a “mere conduit” for the Thurmans, who
were directly responsible for paying the debt.139
Sun Bank received payments directly from Thurman Construction
and credited those payments towards the line of credit established by
the Thurmans, thereby reducing the outstanding balance.140 The court
found that as the payee on this revolving loan account, Sun Bank actu-
ally gained control over the funds received from Thurman Construc-
tion.141 By earmarking these funds for immediate use in paying down
Thurman Construction’s line of credit (i.e., debt owed) and thereby
exercising legal dominion and control over the funds, the court held
that Sun Bank was an initial transferee under section 550(a)(1).142 As
a result, the bankruptcy trustee could recover preferential transfers
from Sun Bank.143
VI. FREIGHT FACTORING COMPANIES FIT WITHIN THE MEANING
OF MERE CONDUIT
Just as the financial intermediaries in the preceding cases, freight
factoring companies find themselves involved in bankruptcy proceed-
ings where trustees claim that payments made to the freight factoring
companies were preferential and, thus, should be returned to the
bankruptcy estate.144 However, freight factoring companies should not
be subject to preference claims because, when evaluated against the
bankruptcy courts’ criteria for an initial transferee, they consistently
fall within the status of a mere conduit.
136. Id. at 1009.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 1016; Nordberg v. Arab Banking Corp. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.),
904 F.2d 588, 599 (11th Cir. 1990).
139. In re Thurman Constr., Inc., 189 B.R. at 1016.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 892 (7th Cir.
1988); In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 904 F.2d at 599.
143. See In re Thurman Constr., Inc., 189 B.R. at 1017.
144. See Salomon v. Nedlloyd, Inc. (In re Black & Geddes, Inc.), 59 B.R. 873, 874
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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A. Freight Factoring Companies Are Similar to Banks
Acting as Intermediaries
Freight factoring companies, like banks acting as financial in-
termediaries, do not satisfy the dominion and control test or the direct
business relationship standard established by the courts. Freight fac-
toring companies are not free to invest transfers in whatever way they
choose,145 and they do not have the direct business relationships with
debtors that give rise to the payments they receive. In this way, freight
factoring companies are similar to banks acting as financial in-
termediaries and, in avoidance actions under section 550(a)(1), should
not be found to be initial transferees, but rather mere conduits.
In Bonded Financial Services, the bank received and deposited a
check from Bonded, but it was obligated to apply the payment as
stated on “the instructions that came with the check.”146 Likewise,
when a freight factoring company receives transfers from its client’s
debtors, the funds are applied to its client’s invoices according to the
remittance instructions accompanying the transfers.147 The freight fac-
toring company merely processes the payments without dominion or
control over the funds, acting as a mere conduit.148
This same lack of dominion or control is why the court in In re Co-
lombian Coffee found that Mobile Bank was not an initial trans-
feree.149 Mobile Bank received funds from a third party, deposited the
funds, and made those funds available to their client, General Cof-
fee.150 General Coffee then used those same funds to pay another
party.151 Since Mobile Bank did not have discretion to put the trans-
ferred funds it received to its own use, it did not exercise dominion or
control over the funds.152
Likewise, a freight factoring company receives payments from a
third party and applies those payments to its client’s invoices.153 The
freight factoring company must apply the funds according to the re-
mittance it receives from the third party.154 Paid invoices are identi-
fied in this way eliminating the freight factoring company’s right to
charge back the invoices to the client. A freight factoring company has
145. See Bonded, 838 F.2d at 894.
146. Id. at 891–93.
147. Small-Business Financing, supra note 5.
148. See Kirschenbaum v. Leeds Morelli & Brown P.C. (In re The Robert Plan of
N.Y. Corp.), 456 B.R. 150, 159 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011).
149. Metsch v. First Ala. Bank (In re Colombian Coffee Co.), 59 B.R. 643, 645
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986).
150. Id. at 644.
151. Metsch v. City Nat’l Bank (In re Colombian Coffee Co.), 64 B.R. 585, 585
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986).
152. See In re Colombian Coffee Co., 59 B.R. at 645.
153. See Small-Business Financing, supra note 5.
154. Id.
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no discretion to put the payments it receives to its own use and, there-
fore, does not exercise dominion or control over those payments.
According to the court, Mobile Bank “derived no benefit from the
[funds received], other than its customary fee for its banking ser-
vices.”155 Mobile Bank was also “granted no discretion with respect to
the disposition of the property entrusted to it [and Mobile Bank]
could not have refused to follow the debtor’s instructions.”156 Simi-
larly, freight factoring companies derive no benefit from the payments
they receive, other than their customary fees for factoring services.157
Absent payments, freight factoring companies have the right to re-
cover advances on unpaid invoices from their clients.158 Freight factor-
ing companies must apply the payments they receive according to the
debtor’s remittance instructions to eliminate this right of recovery
from their client for unpaid invoices.159 They have no discretion to
apply or use the payments as they wish. Just as Mobile Bank, freight
factoring companies cannot refuse to follow debtors’ instructions with
respect to the application of payments they receive.160 Freight factor-
ing companies are mere conduits just as banks are when acting as fi-
nancial intermediaries.
In addition to lacking dominion or control over funds they receive
from debtors, freight factoring companies also do not have direct busi-
ness relationships with these debtors that give rise to the payments.
The direct business dealing that leads to a freight factoring company
receiving payment from a debtor occurs between a debtor and a truck-
ing company. A trucking company transports freight for a debtor, and
the debtor pays the trucking company for this service. This payment is
simply redirected from the trucking company to a freight factoring
company because of the factoring agreement entered into between
those two parties. According to the Fourth Circuit, “a party cannot be
an initial transferee if he is a mere conduit for the party who ha[s] a
direct business relationship with the debtor.”161 Thus, the freight fac-
toring company acts only as an intermediary between the trucking
company and a debtor. Since “a party cannot be an initial transferee if
it is a mere [intermediary] for the party who had the direct business
relationship with the debtor,”162 a freight factoring company should
not be liable as an initial transferee under section 550(a)(1).
155. In re Colombian Coffee Co., 59 B.R. at 645.
156. Id.
157. See TATGE ET AL., supra note 1.
158. Id. at 241.
159. Small-Business Financing, supra note 5; see TATGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 241.
160. In re Colombian Coffee Co., 59 B.R. at 645; Small-Business Financing, supra
note 5.
161. Lowry v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc. (In re Columbia Data Prods., Inc.), 892
F.2d 26, 28 (4th Cir. 1989).
162. ZVI Guttman v. Constr. Program Grp. (In re Railworks Corp.) 760 F.3d 398,
404 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Columbia Data Prods., 892 F.2d at 28).
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B. Freight Factoring Companies Are Different from Banks
as Payees on Loans
Freight factoring companies differ from banks that are payees on
loans because freight factoring companies do not lend money nor
have discretion in applying payments.163 As such, freight factoring
companies do not exercise dominion or control over the funds they
receive. Instead, freight factoring companies enter into transactions
with trucking companies to purchase accounts receivable at a dis-
count.164 The parties’ intention is to enter into a factoring agreement,
not for the freight factoring company to provide a loan or line of
credit to the trucking company.165 Disciplined invoice-by-invoice and
payment-by-payment processing occurs in a factoring relationship.166
Conversely, banks as payees on loans have unrestricted legal control
over the funds they receive, thereby satisfying the Bonded Financial
Services dominion and control test and falling within the meaning of
an initial transferee under section 550(a)(1).167
In In re Coutee, Security First loaned money to the Coutees and
then was repaid in full on the loan once the Coutees received a settle-
ment from a personal injury case.168 Soon thereafter, an avoidance
action for the loan payment funds was brought against Security First
on the grounds that these funds were preferential.169 The Fifth Circuit
found that Security First was an initial transferee and liable to return
the loan payment funds because, as the payee on the loan, Security
First had complete legal control over the funds and was free to invest
the funds in any way that it wanted.170
In contrast, freight factoring companies purchase accounts receiva-
ble and advance funds to trucking companies.171 In collecting on pay-
ments, freight factoring companies must apply these funds based on
the remittance information received from debtors.172 So not only does
a freight factoring company not lend money to its clients, it does not
163. See TATGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 423.
164. Id.
165. See Express Working Capital, LLC v. Starving Students, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d
660, 665–66 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Korrody v. Miller, 126 S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2003, no pet.) (citing TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 306.103(b) (West 2016));
§ 306.103(a); see also TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 306.001(1) (West 2016).
166. Jim Wilkinson, What is Factoring Receivables?, THE STRATEGIC CFO (July 24,
2013), http://strategiccfo.com/wikicfo/what-is-factoring-receivables/ [http://perma.cc/
4Q9S-GKQ4] (discussing the Collections Report and Reserve Report that details in-
voice and payment information for clients).
167. See Sec. First Nat’l Bank v. Brunson (In re Coutee), 984 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir.
1993) (quoting Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 893 (7th
Cir. 1988)).
168. Id. at 139–40.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 139, 141–42 (quoting Bonded, 838 F.2d at 894).
171. TATGE ET AL., supra note 1.
172. Small-Business Financing, supra note 5.
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have dominion or control over the payments it receives from debtors.
An avoidance action against a freight factoring company on the
grounds of preferential transfer should fail. Unlike banks as payees on
loans, that extend credit and have dominion or control over funds re-
ceived, freight factoring companies are mere conduits of the funds
they receive without discretion to do what they wish with those funds.
Bankruptcy courts have established that “a preference cannot exist in
the absence of an extension of credit.”173
C. Case on Point: In re Black & Geddes, Inc.
Black & Geddes, Inc. (“Geddes”) was a freight forwarder that
needed to transport some product to Pakistan by way of steamship.174
Hoegh Lines was the ocean carrier that moved this freight for Ged-
des.175 Nedlloyd, Inc. and Hoegh had a business relationship where
Nedlloyd collected on payments due to Hoegh based on the freight
that Hoegh delivered.176 Once Nedlloyd received payment, it would
deduct its commission from that payment and give the remainder of
the freight payment over to Hoegh.177 For the freight Hoegh moved to
Pakistan, Geddes sent Nedlloyd a check in the amount of
$21,785.73.178 Sometime after this payment was made, Geddes filed
for bankruptcy.179 The bankruptcy trustee then brought an adversary
proceeding against Nedlloyd seeking to recover the $21,785.73 as a
preferential transfer.180
The court found that the transfer to Nedlloyd was not preferential
because “the transfer was not in payment of any indebtedness, antece-
dent or otherwise, owed to Nedlloyd. The indebtedness was due to
Hoegh, the ocean carrier which performed the services.”181 By simply
receiving payment and forwarding it onto the carrier, Nedlloyd acted
as a mere conduit of the funds and not as an initial transferee under
section 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.182 Even the commission
which Nedlloyd received would not be subject to a preference attack
because Geddes did not owe this fee to Nedlloyd.183 The fee was
solely due from Hoegh, and the manner in which it was paid to Nedl-
loyd was agreed to by the parties.184 Hoegh allowed Nedlloyd to de-
173. Salomon v. Nedlloyd, Inc. (In re Black & Geddes, Inc.), 59 B.R. 873, 875
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting Eisenberg v. E. Carolina Ship Agencies (In re Tim-
ber Line, Ltd.), 59 B.R. 728, 731 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)).







181. Id. at 875.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 874 n.2.
184. Id.
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duct its fee from the payments it collected instead of sending the full
payment to Hoegh and then waiting for Hoegh to send a check to
Nedlloyd for its fee.185
The facts of In re Black & Geddes are remarkably analogous to
daily transactions involving freight factoring companies. A debtor en-
gages a trucking company to transport some sort of product (i.e.,
freight) in exchange for an agreed upon rate. Once the delivery of the
freight has been completed, the trucking company factors its invoice
with a freight factoring company that processes and advances funds to
the trucking company. The freight factoring company then processes
the payment owed to the trucking company. Once the payment is re-
ceived, the freight factoring company deducts its fee and applies the
remainder of the payment to the trucking company’s invoices based
on the debtor’s instructions. These series of transactions are nearly
identical to those between Geddes, Nedlloyd, and Hoegh. The only
difference is the timing of when funds are received by the company
that provided the transportation service. When Nedlloyd received
payment from Geddes, it deducted its commission and forwarded the
funds to Hoegh.186 In a freight factoring relationship, funds are re-
ceived by the trucking company that provided service in advance of
payment by the debtor, subject to the risk of a chargeback if the pay-
ment is not made.187 This slight variation in facts is not enough to
change the underlying role of each party.
The court found that the funds Geddes sent Nedlloyd were not
preferential because those funds were not sent as payment for any
obligation Geddes owed Nedlloyd.188 By accepting payment from
Geddes and then passing it onto Hoegh, Nedlloyd acted as a mere
conduit of the funds and not as an initial transferee under section
550(a)(1).189 Similarly, a debtor does not send funds to a freight fac-
toring company as payment for any indebtedness owed to the freight
factoring company. By accepting payment from a debtor and applying
it to a trucking company’s invoice, a freight factoring company only
acts as a mere conduit of the payment. Consistent with the court’s
reasoning, freight factoring companies should not be classified as ini-
tial transferees under section 550(a)(1).
VII. CONCLUSION
The mere conduit defense should extend to freight factoring compa-
nies when the funds received become the subject of an avoidable pref-
erence claim. Section 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code “imposes
absolute liability on an initial transferee in possession of property
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See TATGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 120–21, 241.
188. In re Black & Geddes, Inc., 59 B.R. at 875.
189. Id. at 875–76.
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which has been subject to avoidance.”190 Analyzing the “initial trans-
feree” language in Bankruptcy Code section 550(a)(1), courts have
shown concern that “the first person who touched the check . . . could
be held liable.”191 When funds are sent from one party to another, the
first person who receives that check may have nothing to do with it
other than “facilitating its transfer from the debtor to a third party,
and may thus be an entirely innocent party who could not equitably
be held liable for the property.”192
This potential inequity is why courts developed and continue to ap-
ply the dominion and control test and in doing so, formed the mere
conduit defense.193 Courts have found the mere conduit defense most
appropriate and successful in situations where “the initial transferees
are innocent parties such as banks, acting merely as innocent in-
termediaries in transferring assets.”194 Banks acting as financial in-
termediaries do not exercise dominion or control over the funds they
receive and in many cases, no longer possess the funds when the bank-
ruptcy trustee is seeking recovery.
In the same vein, freight factoring companies lack the requisite do-
minion or control when they receive funds from debtors. Freight fac-
toring companies are obligated to apply the funds they receive to their
client’s invoices being paid by the funds. Therefore, freight factoring
companies do not exercise dominion or control over the funds for
their own benefit, have no right to use the funds for their own pur-
poses, and have no discretion to use the funds in accordance with their
own wishes. Once received by a freight factoring company, funds are
applied according to the debtor’s remittance advice and any remaining
amount is distributed by the freight factoring company to its client,
less its fee. A freight factoring company never possesses funds re-
ceived from debtors. They are simply processors of payments that ad-
vance funds to clients in advance of payments from debtors.
Additionally, freight factoring companies do not have a direct busi-
ness relationship with debtors. Rather, it is the freight factoring com-
pany’s client who is receiving those funds as payment for a service
rendered to the debtor. Therefore, the client and the debtor have the
direct business relationship and, as a result, the freight factoring com-
pany cannot be classified as an initial transferee.
Looking at the dominion and control test as well as the direct busi-
ness relationship test, freight factoring companies should be viewed as
190. Craig H. Averch, Protection of the “Innocent” Initial Transferee of an Avoida-
ble Transfer: An Application of the Plain Meaning Rule Requiring Use of Judicial Dis-
cretion, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 595, 595–96 (1995).
191. Id. at 616.
192. Theuman, supra note 31, at 635.
193. See Timothy A. Barnes, Sections 548 and 550—Recent Developments in the
Law of Fraudulent Transfers and Recoveries, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANK-
RUPTCY LAW 31 (William L. Norton, Jr. et al. eds., 2007).
194. Id.
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financial intermediaries that are mere conduits for the funds they re-
ceive. To “requir[e] financial intermediaries to ‘return’ funds to the
estate, which they no longer possess and never really owned, seems
particularly inequitable.”195 Consequently, the mere conduit defense
should be successfully applied to freight factoring companies.
195. Adele, supra note 8.
